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I. Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine (commonly referred to as "R2P") was developed
over the last decade in response to the various successes and failures of humanitarian
interventions during the 1990s. The United Nations Security Council recently used this emerging
norm as a justification for Resolution 1973, which authorized "all necessary measures" for
member countries to protect civilians in Libya. 1 After the death of former Libyan leader
Muammar Gaddafi on October 20, 2011, NATO's leaders announced the conclusion of its
humanitarian intervention in Libya, which had been initiated in accordance with Resolution
1973.2 Many western leaders have called the operation a model for future interventions under the
R2P doctrine. 3 However, since the beginning of the 'Arab Spring,' the wave of uprisings
beginning in Tunisia and spreading throughout the Arab World over the course of 2011, several
other Middle Eastern governments have cracked down on peaceful protesters, most notably in
the dictatorial regimes of Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Of these countries, the crackdown in Syria
is particularly notable for its regime's blatant commission of crimes against humanity.
By early December 2011, the death toll in Syria had reached an estimated 3,500 and by
mid-December, clashes between protestors and government military forces had resulted in the
deaths of over 5,000 men, women and children. 4 Most world leaders and organizations have
acknowledged that clear evidence exists of crimes against humanity committed by the regime of
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Nevertheless, the international community has taken few
concrete actions regarding the situation in Syria. International actors have reacted dissimilarly to
S.C. Res. 1973, ~ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
Laura Smith-Spark, NATO Names Oct. 31 as Early End Date for Libyan Mission, CNN (Oct. 21, 2011, 9: 12 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/20 11/10/21 /world/africa/libya-war-nato/index.html.
3
Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Death ofMuammar Qaddafi (Oct. 20,
2011 ), http://www .whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 11/1 0/20/remarks-president-death-muammar-qaddafi.
4
Syria Death Toll Tops 3,500, UN Says, BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-15635867; Khaled Yacoub Oweis, Syria Death Toll Hits 5,000 as Insurgency Spreads, REUTERS, Dec.
13, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/us-syria-idUSTRE7B90F520111213.
1
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the violence in Libya and Syria due to various political factors, but if the U.N. and major world
powers continue their failure to respond effectively to the deaths of civilians in Syria, the
emerging international legal norm ofR2P, so recently bolstered by the Libyan intervention's
success, will suffer a significant blow to its legitimacy.

II. International Law Governing Humanitarian Intervention
A. The Use of Force under the United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter provides a framework for international laws governing the
use of force between states. Article 1 of the Charter describes the purposes of the U.N. and
includes taking "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace" in order to maintain international peace and security. 5 Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits
states from using the "threat or use of unlawful force" against another state's territorial integrity. 6
Furthermore, Article 2(7) says that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 7
The only exception to this protection of state sovereignty is the "application of enforcement
measures" by the Security Council under Chapter VII. 8
If the Security Council determines that there is a threat to peace or security, it may take
actions under Article 41 and Article 42, in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Article 41 of the
U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the ability to authorize certain measures not involving
the use offorce9 • Article 42 allows the Security Council to authorize measures involving the use
of force, by land, air or sea, as is necessary to maintain or restore international peace. 10 The Gulf

5

U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
7
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.

6

8
9

Jd

U.N. Charter art. 41, para. 1.
U.N. Charter art. 42, para. 1.

10
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War in 1990 demonstrates the historical understanding of Article 42 authorization. Iraq violated
Kuwait's territorial sovereignty in contravention of Art. 2(4), and the Security Council entered
many resolutions designed to cause Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. However, Article 41
economic sanctions proved inadequate, so the Security Council authorized military force if Iraq
did not withdraw. This gave the so-called "Coalition of the Willing" the authority to lawfully
intervene with air strikes. 11 Article 42 authorization has since been used to approve military
humanitarian intervention operations.
B. History of International Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Intervention
Prior to 2000, peacekeeping missions and humanitarian interventions were characterized
by inconsistency, incompetence, and underfunding. Though President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
envisioned the United Nations primarily as a mechanism for coordinating "the use of force to
deter or defeat acts of aggression" in the wake of World War II, the organization's weak
secretariat and ideologically divided Security Council initially prevented the UN from effectively
addressing international security issues. 12 In 1956, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
initiated U.N. peacekeeping to respond to the Suez Canal Crisis. These peacekeeping troops
could use their weapons only in self-defense, in order to maintain their separation from
conflict. 13 The Cold War limited the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping missions because the
forces could be used only when U.S. and Soviet perspectives on an issue aligned. 14 In 1961, the
U.N. Security Council authorized U.N. peacekeepers to use force to keep the new Congolese
state intact, which led to a messy and violent conflict. As a result, the U.N. stopped issuing

11

JAMES TRAUB, THE BEST INTENTIONS: KOFI ANNAN AND THE

(I st ed. 2006).
12
!d. at 4-8.
13
TRAUB, supra note II , at II.
14
ld. at 14.

3

UN IN THE ERA OF AMERICAN WORLD POWER 26-28

mandates authorizing its peacekeeping troops to use force. 15 However, the end of the Cold War
enabled the U.N. to extend its diplomatic and mediation efforts to countries and regions where it
had previously been unable to take action. In 1988 and 1989, five peacekeeping missions were
established in Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, Namibia and the border regions between
Iran and Iraq. 16 In August 1990,when Iraq blatantly violated the territory of a sovereign state by
invading Kuwait, it provided a perfect opportunity for the U.N. Security Council to utilize its
Article 42 power to authorize "all necessary means" to enforce an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,
in Resolution 678. 17 This move, and the ensuing successful military operation undertaken by the
"Coalition of the Willing," signaled that with the end of the Cold War, the U.N. could finally
fulfill its mission for enforcing global peace and security. 18
Until the 1990s, there was an understanding in international law that involvement in
another sovereign state's international affairs was illegitimate. However, crises in the 1990s led
to the development of the idea that state sovereignty should not supersede the importance of
humanitarian concerns. 19 In April 1991, the U.N. passed Resolution 680 to respond to Iraqi
repression of Kurdish civilians, and thus the United States and its Gulf War allies launched
"Operation Provide Comfort" to protect the Kurdish population with ground and air support?0 In
December 1992, the U.N. authorized a humanitarian intervention to provide famine assistance
and humanitarian relief to the people of war-torn Somalia. While the U.S.-led mission,
"Operation Restore Hope," successfully saved lives, it also notoriously led to Somali and

15

TRAUB, supra note 11, at 15-16.
ld. at 25.
17
TRAUB, supra note 11, at 26-28; S.C. Res 678, ~ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
18
TRAUB, supra note 11, at 28.
19
ld. at 109-115.
20
SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 237-241 (1st ed. 2002).
16
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American casualties and a civil war that continues today.

21

In the wake of the Somalia fiasco,

the U.N. authorized a small and underfunded peacekeeping mission to enforce a peace treaty that
had ended Rwanda's civil war?2 In early 1994, General Romeo Dallaire, head of the
peacekeeping force, warned the U.N. that the Hutus were planning to exterminate the Tutsis. He
appealed to the Security Council for the authority to prevent the genocide, yet the U.N. refused
to expand the peacekeeping mandate. 23 On April6, 1994, the Rwandan genocide began. The
Tutsis pled with the U.N. to intervene, but the UN instead ended the peacekeeping mission and
both the U.N. and the U.S. failed to act in an effective or timely manner?4 By the time a Tutsiled rebellion ended the killing on July 18, 1994, nearly 800,000 Rwandans had died in the
genocide. 25
The Bosnian War also displayed the U.N.'s ineptitude at handling post-Cold War civil
conflicts through traditional peacekeeping strategies. On March 27, 1992, Bosnian Serbs
declared a Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April6, 1992, the Bosnian War began
and on April 7, the U.N. recognized Bosnia Herzegovina as an independent state. 26 Despite clear
evidence of ethnic cleansing during the Bosnian War, foreign governments cited the complexity
of the conflict as justification for inaction. 27 Measures taken by foreign governments mainly
consisted of symbolic gestures, sanctions, and peace talks, all aimed at soothing public outrage at
media coverage of atrocities.

28

This apparent unwillingness to commit a credible military force to

21

Jon Western & Joshua Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes ofAge, FOREIGN AFF., Nov. 1, 2011,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein!Humanitarian-interventioncomes-of-age; TRAUB, supra note 11, at. 42-43.
22
Western & Goldstein, supra note 21; POWER, supra note 20, at 329-389.
23
POWER, supra note 20, at 329-389.
24 ld
25
POWER, supra note 20, at 329-389.
26
CAROLE ROGEL, THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS AFTERMATH 29 (1st ed. 2004 ).
27
POWER, supra note 20, at 260-261.
28 Jd.
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ending ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian War only emboldened the Serb forces. 29 On July 11 ,
1995, Bosnian Serb forces overran weak U.N. peacekeeping defenses to seize the "safe area" of
Srebrenica. U.N. Force Commander General Bernard Janvier refused to request NATO support
despite clear signs of mass executions. By July 24, the U.N. special rapporteur for human rights
for the former Yugoslavia reported that more than 7,000 of Srebrenica's 40,000 civilians had
been executed. More than two years earlier, in March 1993, the U.N. Security Council had
passed Resolution 816 authorizing states to use "all necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia
and Herzegovina" to enforce a no-fly zone. 30 In June 1993, Resolution 836 authorized the use of
force for protection of certain designated U.N. safe areas, such as Srebrenica. 31 After the Bosnian
Serbs overran Srebrenica, a NATO-led operation finally acted under the authority of these
resolutions and enforced Western rhetoric with credible military action, by bombing Serbian
military targets? 2 On September 8, 1995, the parties agreed to participate in peace negotiations
and on December 14 the Dayton Peace Accords were officially signed. 33
By the end of 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton had finally realized that noninvolvement
could be more costly than the risks ofinvolvement. 34 This mentality resulted in a swift
intervention in Kosovo to protect ethnic Albanians from violence committed by Serbian forces in
1999. The NATO bombing campaign commenced without authority from the U.N. Security
Council and was tainted by the strategic motivations of intervening powers. Nevertheless, the
intervention saved lives and ended the fighting in Kosovo. The international community largely
viewed the intervention as illegal under the U.N. Charter yet legitimate because of widespread

29

Western & Goldstein, supra note 21 .
S.C. Res 816, ~ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (Mar. 31 , 1993).
31
S.C. Res 836, ~ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (June 4, 1993).
32
ROGEL, supra note 26, at 36-37.
33
I d. at 38-40.
34 p
OWER, supra note 20, at 441.
30
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international approval and its basis in human rights-oriented goals.

35

Likewise, U.N. Secretary-

General Kofi Annan stated in a speech that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was entirely
consistent with the language and spirit of the U.N. Charter and that the Security Council must not
fail to act as it had done in Rwanda and Kosovo, thereby setting the stage for the R2P doctrine to
develop. 36 Meanwhile, the former colonies in the developing world balked at the apparent threat
to the principle of state sovereignty. 37 Therefore, at the tum of the 21st century, many
uncertainties persisted as to how the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would develop in the
future. 38

C. The Emergence of the "Responsibility to Protect" Doctrine
"Humanitarian Intervention" has been defined as the use of force against a territorial state
by another state or a collective group of states, with or without authorization from the United
Nations Security Council, for the promotion or protection of basic human rights of individuals,
other than intervening states' own citizens, without the permission from the territorial state
within whose borders the use of force takes place. 39 The idea of humanitarian intervention thus
presented a conflict between territorial sovereignty and the idea of human security. In September
2000, the Canadian government announced to the U.N. General Assembly that it would establish
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ("ICISS") to respond to the
questions surfacing in the wake ofKosovo. 40 The December 2012 ICISS report, entitled "The
Responsibility to Protect," proposed a new perspective on the question of when, if ever, it is
appropriate for states to take military action against another state for the purpose of protecting

35
36

TRAUB,
TRAUB,

37

ld.

supra note 11, at 109-115; POWER, supra note 20, at 460-473.
supra note 11, at 109-115.

38

TRAUB, supra note 11, at 109-115.
J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL DILEMMAS 15, 18 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003).
40
THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1-2 (2001).
39
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people at risk in that state. 41 According to the new concept of Responsibility to Protect
promulgated by ICISS, sovereignty implies an inherent obligation to protect the people within
the state. 42 If a state is unwilling or unable to prevent its people from suffering serious harm, then
the international community has a responsibility to step in.

43

The ICISS Report declared that the foundations of this concept could be found in
international law, meaning it was already an emerging principle. First, sovereignty has always
carried certain obligations, such as respecting other states' sovereignty. 44 Second, the U.N.
Charter directs the Security Council to maintain international peace and security, demonstrating
an existing responsibility on the part of the international community .45 Third, legal obligations
under covenants and treaties of international humanitarian and international human rights law
provide benchmarks of conduct expected under internationallaw. 46 Additionally, universal
jurisdiction provisions under various treaties and under customary international law permit states
to try those accused of serious international crimes. 47 In fact, the 1998-1999 Augusto Pinochet
case in the British House of Lords demonstrated that government leaders have no sovereign
immunity regarding serious violations of international criminal law while in office. 48 Lastly,
intervention when states fail to protect their civilians had been put into practice by states,

41

Jd. at 3-7.

42

THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 13.

43

I d. at 16-18.

44

THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 7-8.

45

ld. at 13.

46

THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 6, 8, 16, 50; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime of Genocide art. 1-13, Dec. 9, 1948,78 U.N.T.S. 277; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 1-18, Aug. 12,
1949,6 U.S.T. 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.1-16,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War art. 126, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1/ (Sept. 16, 2005); Rome Statute of the lnt'l Crim. Court art. 22-33,
July 17, 1998,2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
47
THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 6, 14,24-25.
48
Regina v. Bartle and Commission of Police, Ex Parte Pinochet, United Kingdom, House of Lords, 1999, 38
I.L.M. 581 (1999).
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regional bodies and the U.N. in the 1990s. 49 The ICISS proposed that three specific
responsibilities fall under this doctrine, which are the responsibilities to prevent, react and
rebuild. 50 The report also set forth criteria necessary for legitimate intervention. The violation of
human rights must be extremely grave and humanitarian motivations must dominate other
intentions; 51 there must be no other means of rectifying the violations, and the primary purpose
must be to avert human suffering. 52 The least destructive means possible should be taken and
there must be a reasonable likelihood of success. 53 Finally, the use of force must be supported by
those whose will be benefitted by the force and authorized by the U.N. Security Council. 54
In 2004, the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change
addressed R2P again. 55 The Panel asserted that under the 1948 Genocide Convention, states
agree that genocide is a crime under international law and they must prevent or punish it. 56
Therefore, since the global community has recognized genocide as a threat to international peace
and security, the principle of sovereignty cannot be used to protect acts of genocide or other
large-scale violations of international human rights law. 57 The panel explicitly endorsed R2P as
an emerging norm and set out potential criteria for determining whether to authorize use of
military force: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance

49

THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 15-16.
ld. at 74.
51
THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 32-36.
52
Jd. at 36-37.
53
THE INT. COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND ST. SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 40, at 37.
54
Jd. at 35-36.
55
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,~ 203,
U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
56
ld. at~~ 66, 200, 233.
57
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, supra note 55, at~ 200.
50

9

of consequences. 58 The March 2005 Report of the Secretary-General also urged states to embrace
and use R2P as a basis for collective action to prevent or end mass atrocities. 59
Finally, at the 2005 U.N. World Summit, Member States unanimously endorsed the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine in Sections 13 8-140 of the Outcome Document.

60

Section 13 8

provides that every state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

61

This is a much narrower application of

the protection than originally proposed in the 2001 report. The Outcome Document precludes the
R2P doctrine's use in cases of natural disasters, epidemics and other serious suffering that does
not fall under the four situations enumerated in Section 138. Under Section 139, the international
community has the responsibility to protect civilian populations from the listed atrocities with
peaceful means and, when absolutely necessary, forceful collective action, through the
mechanism of the U.N. 62 Unlike the 2001 ICISS Report and the 2004 High Panel Report, the
Outcome Document did not provide guidance for Security Council decisions implementing the
doctrine. Following the 2005 World Summit, the Security Council acknowledged R2P in
Resolution 1674 in April2006 and later reaffirmed its commitment to the doctrine in November
2009 with Resolution 1894. 63 In August 2007, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed
the establishment of a Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, which the Security

Id at~203
U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,~ 132,
U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
60
Western & Goldstein, supra note 21.
61
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 6011, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
62 ld
63
Key Developments on the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations 2005-2011, INT'L COALITION FOR THE
R2P (20 11 ), http://www .responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICRtopo/o20Latest%20Developments%20at%20the%20UN
%202011.
58

59
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Council approved in December 2007. 64 The General Assembly also adopted a resolution on the
doctrine in September 2009.

65

Since 2005, Reports of the Secretary-General urged Member States to agree on further
specifics for the Security Council to use in applying the R2P doctrine. The 2009 Report
emphasized that the doctrine includes three pillars of equal importance: the protection
responsibilities of the State, capacity building, and timely and decisive response from the
international community. 66 The 2010 Report focused on building the U.N.'s ability to share
information and improve its early warning system in order to enable states to take timely and
well-informed action. 67 The 2011 Report addressed the role of regional organizations in
implementing R2P. 68 It notes that while Article 52 of the U.N. encourages regional settlement of
disputes, Article 53 provides that no enforcement action may occur without Security Council
authorization. 69 However, in 2000, the African Union agreed upon a right to intervention to when
authorized by the organization due to grave circumstances; this provision created as a result of
the perception that the U.N. had ignored human rights crises in Africa during the 1990s. 70
Despite the existence of this principle in the African Union's 2000 Constitutive Act,
authorization by the Security Council as a prerequisite for legal use of force under R2P has been
a common theme of all reports and agreements on the doctrine since 2001. 71 Since the 2005
World Summit, the Security Council had invoked the R2P doctrine without authorizing military
Id.
G.A. Res. 63/308, ~ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Sept. 14, 2009).
66
U.N. Secretary General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,~ 11, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
67
U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect,~ 19, A/64/864 (July 14,
2010).
68
U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the R2P, ~ 3,
A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011).
69
I d. at~ 5.
70
Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies 'Responsibility to Protect at Berlin
Event on 'Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World,' U.N. Press Release
SG/SM/11701 (July 15, 2008); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 66, at~ 8.
71
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 66, at~ 56; Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), Nov. 07, 2011,
2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
64
65
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force to prevent election violence in Kenya in 2007, Guinea in 2010 and Sudan in 2011. 72 By
early 2011, the remaining ambiguity surrounding R2P largely pertained to its practical
implementation in authorizing use of force and the operational aspects of a military intervention.
Libya provided the first example of Security Council authorization for military humanitarian
intervention under the R2P doctrine.

III. Responsibility to Protect in the Context of the Arab Spring
On December 18,2010, the self-immolation of a fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, in
protest of Tunisia's corruption sparked demonstrations that eventually led to the January 14,
2011 ouster of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. 73 Tunisia's protests created a wave of
uprisings that spread throughout the Middle East. By December 2011, former Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak, former Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and former Yemeni President
Ali Abdullah Saleh had all been forced from power. 74 Other governments, including those of
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Morocco, and Jordan, implemented government changes and
constitutional reforms in response to civil protests. 75 In Bahrain and Syria, unrest continues to
grow and threaten the legitimacy of those countries' regimes. 76
Throughout the uprisings of 2011, Western states struggled with questions concerning
how to appropriately respond. Countries like the United States stumbled as they tried to weigh
their own national interests against the need to support the push for democracy. For example,
72

Simon Adams, R2P and the Libya Mission, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28,2011, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/
commentary/la-oe-adams-r2p-20110928,0,1407335.story; INT'L COALITION FOR THE R2P, supra note 63.
73
Rania Abouzeid, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself and Tunisia on Fire, TIME, Jan. 21,2011,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.htm1.
74
Abigail Hauslohner & Yasmine El Rashidi, The 18-Day Miracle: Egyptian People Power Ousts Hosni Mubarak,
TIME, Feb. 11, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2048575,00.html; Raina Abouzeid, In Libya's
Wake, Pressure Builds on Assad, TIME, Aug. 22, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2089934,00.
html; Abdullah al-Shihri & Ben Hubbard, Yemen President Saleh Quits Amid Uprisings, TIME, Nov. 23,2011,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2100163,00.html.
75
Garry Blight, Sheila Pulliam & Paul Torpey, Arab Spring: An Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests,
GUARDIAN .co. UK, http://www .guardian. co. uk/world/interactive/20 11/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactivetimeline (last updated Nov. 29, 2011).
76

ld.
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Egyptians criticized the United States President Barack Obama for his delayed response to their
call for Mubarak's ouster. 77 The United Nations Security Council's decision to take action in
Libya demonstrated Western powers' desire to seem supportive of the Arab Spring, thereby
bolstering their self-perceived role of protecting civilians and supporting democratic values. The
Arab League's support of Resolution 1973 showed an interest in playing an active role in the
region's uprisings and cooperating with NATO and its allies. Doing so increased the
organization's legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and of protesters throughout
the Middle East and North Africa. However, successful military humanitarian intervention in
Libya has been followed by the international community's inability to respond effectively and
coherently to Syria's consistently brutal crackdown on protestors.
A. Military Intervention in Libya
Following the successful removal of Tunisian dictator Ben Ali on January 14 and
Egyptian dictator Mubarak on February 11, protests erupted in Benghazi, Libya on February 15,
2011. 78 The violence escalated quickly and on February 20, 200 protesters were reportedly
massacred. 79 The Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, quickly provoked criticism from the
international community for ordering attacks on peaceful protesters. 80 In response to the rising
death toll, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1970 on February 26, which
referenced the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its civilians, invoked the Security
Council's duty to maintain international peace and security and imposed harsh, specific
economic sanctions on Libya and Gaddafi and his family under Article 41 of the Charter. 81

77

Edmund Sanders, Anti-American Sentiment Gradually Surfaces in Egypt, L.A. TIMES, Feb. I, 20 II,
http://articles.latimes.com/20II/feb/OI/world/la-fg-egypt-anti-american-20II020.
78
Blight, Pulliam &Torpey, supra note 75.
79 /d.
80
Blight, Pulliam &Torpey, supra note 75.
81
S.C. Res 1970, ~~ 9-21, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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However, Gaddafi ignored the Resolution's call to respect international humanitarian law and
continued to violently assault the Libyan rebels who were demanding that he step down. 82
Acknowledging that the Article 41 sanctions had failed to produce positive results, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on March 1783 . This created a no-fly zone with the
broadest scope ever authorized, as well as endorsed direct military action, without a nexus to the
no-fly zone, in order to protect civilians. 84 Resolution 1973 specifically invoked the
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine by echoing the language of Resolution 1970 and again
emphasizing the "responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population" and
that "parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure
the protection of civilians. "85 It specifically refers to widespread and systematic attacks that may
amount to crimes against humanity, as well as human rights violations such as arbitrary
detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions. The resolution also points
to condemnation by the Arab League, African Union and Organization of the Islamic Conference
of these human rights violations to justify its authorization of states taking "all necessary
measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya." Notably, the resolution expressly prohibits the option of a foreign occupation
force in Libya. 86 As this was the broadest authorization of force in a humanitarian intervention
situation, it was very important for the parties involved in the collective action to show restraint
and stay within the mandate of Resolution 1973. 87
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The mandate of Resolution 1973 allowed international states and organizations to take
"all necessary measures" to protect civilians. Under customary laws of war, rebel forces engaged
in combat are not considered civilians for purposes of humanitarian law. 88 NATO forces had the
authority to enforce the no-fly zone and to use force to protect civilians, but not to assist the rebel
troops win a civil war. 89 Many observers accused the parties involved in the Libyan Intervention
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of going beyond their U.N. mandate and actively participating in regime change. 9 Countries that
have traditionally been very sensitive to threats to state sovereignty, such as Russia and China,
abstained in voting on Resolution 1973.91 Russia and China did not utilize their veto power in
consideration of support for the Resolution from the Arab League and African Union, but
expressed unease about the absence of limits on the intervention. 92 The other abstaining
delegations acted out of concern for the potential negative implications of armed intervention.
Since then, concerns that have always accompanied the emerging norm of humanitarian
intervention have resurfaced. For example, there has traditionally been a suspicion that
intervening states have an agenda beyond simple protection of citizens, such as promoting
regime change. 93 Thus, NATO's role in Gaddafi's demise has renewed concerns that R2P will be
used merely as a pretext for advancing external countries' own national interests and
participating in regime change. 94
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Nevertheless, Libya has the potential to be a positive example of a multilateral approach
to intervention, as opposed to unilateral military action. However, many of the conditions that
made this situation an ideal case for this approach could be considered unique to Libya and
unlikely to be replicated in the future . First, there was no ambiguity as to whether atrocities
would occur without intervention. Gaddafi promised to "have no mercy and pity" on the civilians
of Benghazi in response to their protests. 95 China and Russia had no alliance or positive
diplomatic ties with Gaddafi's regime or national interests in Libya, and therefore had no reason
to veto authorization of the use of force. 96 Indeed, Gaddafi had few allies in the world by the
time the Arab Spring had begun. Gaddafi was so unpopular even among Arabs that the U.N.
could rely, in its call for use of force in Resolution 1973, on support from the Arab League and
African Union, which increased the intervention's legitimacy. 97 Furthermore, the Arab Spring
had exposed the vulnerability of dictatorial regimes and made Arab leaders eager to demonstrate
support for the Libyan protesters. 98 Libya was of limited strategic value to the United States, so
there was less risk in allowing European powers to take control of the operation. 99 Meanwhile,
Libya's proximity to Europe made European powers more willing to become involved. 100 In
addition, Libya's geography was conducive to waging an airpower campaign, thus allowing for a
successful intervention despite lack of ground forces. 101 The existence of a somewhat organized
opposition movement also gave NATO a group to work with, and reduced the need for a ground
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invasion. 102 Therefore, the unique situation in Libya lent itself to a successful and relatively swift
military intervention, and it has yet to be determined whether Libya can be used as a model for
future humanitarian interventions.

B. Bloodshed in Syria
On January 26, 2011, demonstrators began protesting against the Syrian government. The
movement spread slowly at first, but uprisings finally escalated in March with the city of Dara'a
becoming a focal point ofthe unrest. On March 25, a reported 100,000 protesters marched in
Dara'a, but toward the end of the month, Syrian security forces began attacking Syrian protesters
on the orders of President Bashar al-Assad. 103 By April, the brutality of the regime's crackdown
on protestors became unmistakably apparent. 104 While the violence did not escalate as quickly as
in Libya, attacks on Syrian activists have continued consistently for more than eight months,
resulting in more than 5,000 deaths, according to the United Nations. 105 The Syrian opposition
announced the creation of the Syrian National Council in August, and has since called for U.N.
Security Council action to support their cause. 106 Defectors from the Syrian police and military
have been able to lend more organization and military experience to those fighting on the side of
the opposition. 107 However, pro-Assad rallies in Aleppo, the mainstay of Assad's support, and
continued loyalty from many Syrian soldiers demonstrate that the government can still command
some support, mainly from the Alawites, the Shiite minority that makes up 12% of the Syrian
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In June 2011, Human Rights Watch published a report documenting human rights abuses
in Syria from March through May. According to the report, even in the first three months of the
attacks on protesters, the abuses committed by Assad's regime amounted to crimes against
humanity under international law, according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. 109 Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as acts committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, "pursuant to or in furtherance
of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack," and committed with knowledge of the
attack. 110 The acts that constitute crimes against humanity in Syria's case include systematic
killings of protesters and bystanders (including in mosques and funeral processions), denial of
medical assistance, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, torture, executions and mass graves. 111 In
August 2011, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights issued a report that also
found a pattern of human rights violations constituting widespread or systematic attacks against
the civilian population. 112 In November 2011, Human Rights Watch released another report on
the violence in Syria from mid-April to August, reaffirming that the Assad regime had been
continuously committing human rights abuses. 113 On December 12, 2011, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, reported that more than 5,000 had likely died in
the unrest in Syria, called for urgent action to end violence and repeated her previous calls for the
Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court.
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Assad regime has failed to uphold its responsibilities to Syrian people. Western governments
slowly applied pressure through targeted sanctions but remained less vocal about pushing for
hard sanctions. In September, European countries considered calling for immediate sanctions
against Assad's regime in a proposed Security Council resolution. However, in response to fears
that Russia and China would prevent that resolution from passing, a new U.N. resolution was
drafted to instead threaten sanctions only in the event of continued repression. 115 Despite these
changes, on October 4, 2011, Russia and China vetoed a resolution calling on Syria to end the
violence against its citizens. 116 Many have criticized the vetoes, claiming that they would
embolden Assad to continue his violent tactics. 117 Meanwhile, South Africa, India and Brazil
also opposed sanctions on Syria by the Security Council in October, despite their cautious
support of Resolution 1973 in March 2011. 118
On October 31, 2011, as it drew down its Libyan operation, NATO formally announced
that it had rejected the possibility of military intervention in Syria with a statement by the
organization's Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that he "can completely rule that
out." 119 Nevertheless, in response to the Russian and Chinese vetoes of the Security Council
resolution, Human Rights Watch and other organizations addressed a letter to the U.N. General
Assembly, asking it to condemn the violence in Syria in the context of these events. 120 According
to the Resolution 3 77 A of the U.N. General Assembly, if the Security Council fails to exercise
its responsibility to maintain international peace and security due to a permanent member's veto,
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the General Assembly should consider the matter. 121 Instead, the General Assembly passed a
non-binding resolution condemning the Syrian crackdown on November 23, but it lacked any
legal significance and merely sent a message to Assad. 122 In mid-December 2011, Russia
circulated its own resolution condemning the violence by both sides in Syria but lacking any
mention of an arms embargo or other sanctions. 123 It also came as the Russian Foreign Minister
accused the West of encouraging opposition groups to provoke humanitarian catastrophe. The
draft also included a prohibition on military interference as an interpretation of the resolution. 124
Thus, the proposed resolution would cement Russia's opposition to concrete actions and likely
have no actual effect on the situation.
The Arab League and individual Middle Eastern countries have confronted the Syrian
government more forcefully than the U.N. has. On October 17, 2011, the Arab league gave Syria
a fifteen-day deadline to enact a cease-fire or risk suspension from the Arab League. 125 Those
supporting Syria's suspension included Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia, whereas those
opposed to the suspension included Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon and Yemen. 126 The only other
instance of an Arab League suspension in the history of the 22-state organization came in March
2011 when the League suspended Libya's membership in response to Gaddafi's crackdown. 127
The threat of Syria's suspension signaled a serious blow to Assad's regime in that it deepens its
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isolation from the world and further reduces Arab support. 128 On November 2, 2011, Syria
agreed to a plan put forward by the Arab League. 129 The plan included requirements that Syrian
government forces withdraw all troops from cities and immediately end all violence against
protesters; in addition, Assad's regime had to release all prisoners, begin negotiations with
members of the opposition, and allow journalists and human rights observers into the country. 130
However, violence escalated rather than decreased after Syrian officials signed the agreement, 131
though Syrian officials insisted that they were committed to implementing the plan. In response
to increasing violence resulting in calls for intervention by opposition groups, the Arab League
agreed on November 12 to suspend Syria on November 16 if Assad's regime did not end this
newest crackdown. 132 The suspension was met by violent protests at diplomatic missions of
Qatar, Turkey and Kuwait. 133 On November 16, League representatives ratified the suspension
and gave Assad another three days before they imposed economic sanctions on his
government. 134 The Arab League decided that Syria would remain suspended until it allowed
observers into the country. Meanwhile, the organization as well as individual Member States
have mounted increasingly harsh sanctions on Assad's regime. 135
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IV. Factors in the International Community's Varying Responses to Libya and Syria
Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar Al-Assad both behaved in a manner that clearly signaled a
willingness to use force against their own citizens in response to peaceful protesters. Neither
head of state shied away from using extreme brutality against civilians in response to internal
dissent. The protests and the responding violence began within a few weeks of one another. The
Arab League, African Union, European Union, United Nations and NATO came together to
reject Gaddafi as a legitimate ruler and to invoke the R2P doctrine as justification for a military
intervention to prevent human rights abuses by Gaddafi's regime. The multilateral military
intervention successfully saved countless civilian lives and provided the aerial support necessary
for rebel forces to overthrow Gaddafi and take control of Libya. More than 5,000 Syrians have
been killed in violent clashes directed by Assad over an eight-month period, but the global
reaction has been only harsh words, economic sanctions, and political isolation, rather than any
intervention of the scale or speed similar to that witnessed in Libya. Political and economic
differences in the relationships that Libya and Syria had with their neighbors and the rest of the
world play a large role in the different responses to violence by a regime against its own citizens,
as do concern for the effect of regime change on the stability of the Middle East and
policymakers' experiences and perceptions of history. It can be argued that if the U.N. and its
Members States allow geopolitical motivations and national historical memories to prevent the
international community from upholding its responsibility to protect civilians in Syria, the
emerging international legal norm of R2P will be significantly undermined. Indeed, whereas
Libya provided an example of swift and successful implementation of R2P, the case in Syria
demonstrates how the influence of political, economic, and historical considerations on states'
political will may preclude any possibility of utilizing the R2P doctrine.
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A. Geopolitical, Economic and Domestic Concerns of International Actors
Syria has been a major trading partner for many world powers, including Russia, China,
the United States and the European Union. 136 This has not stopped the U.S. and the European
Union from condemning the violence in Syria and placing economic sanctions against its regime.
However, Assad has retained powerful allies in Russia, China and Iran that leave him less
isolated than Gaddafi had been. Therefore, a level of political protection exists that minimizes
the likelihood of military intervention and provides Assad with a sense of security in his control
over the country. In addition, because China relies on importing oil from Syria, Russia relies on
exporting arms to Syria and Iran provides financial and militaristic support, many economic
sanctions by Europe and other Western powers are less effective because Syria can still trade
with Russia, China and Iran. 137
The U.S. seems extremely reluctant to respond with a Libya-style operation and seems to
be hoping that the situation becomes resolved without outside intervention. This is due partly to
intensifying lack of domestic political support. Obama faces a reelection campaign in 2012 and
must contend with incredibly low poll numbers. 138 The Libyan Intervention did little to increase
his popularity and a similar intervention in Syria most likely will increase public dissatisfaction
with his administration. When Obama announced the plan for humanitarian intervention in Libya
in March, many criticized his multilateral approach to the operation. 139 However, the minimal
cost of the operation, which ended on October 31, 2011, and the lack of any American fatalities
demonstratecl the benefits of taking the back seat in the Libyan NATO intervention.
Nevertheless, U.S. public interest in the Arab Spring has waned since March as economic
136
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problems have become a main priority.

140

Domestic political pressure to address economic issues

have detracted from the U.S. government's ability to take concrete actions in the Middle East. 141
Sharing the financial burden of intervention was key, but even a shared burden will be less
likely to gain American support in the case of Syria. Even so, in comparison to the situation in
Libya, the U.S. has been strikingly slow and ineffective in using its political leverage to
encourage an international response to the atrocities currently being committed by the Syrian
government. 142
Throughout the months that Syrian security forces have been cracking down on
protesters, the U.S. has been partially relying on Turkey for cues on how to handle the crisis in
Syria. Turkey wants to be a regional power, which it can achieve by being the mediator between
the U.S. and Syria and Iran. Prior to the uprising this year, Turkey had expected Syria to play a
key role in its plans to become a political and economic leader in the Middle East. 143 Thus,
Assad staying in power would help Turkey retain its role as mediator and regional leader, so
Turkey was initially very resistant to the idea of regime change. Until November 2011, Turkey
responded to Assad's crackdown by releasing statements urging Assad to make reforms, rather
than suggesting he relinquish power altogether. 144 In addition, Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan had been pressuring Obama to keep his statements and reactions to the events
toned down as well. 145 However, in early November, Erdogan noted that Syria had taken
Turkey's friendship for granted. By November 15, 2011, following the attacks on Turkish
diplomatic missions in Damascus, Erdogan stated that he no longer had confidence in the Syrian
140
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regime. 146 Additionally, Turkey threatened to cut the electricity it supplies to Syria in order to
put pressure on Assad to end the violence.

147

.

On November 22, 2011, Erdogan called for

Assad's resignation. 148 These latest statements may symbolize a willingness on Turkey's part to
support harder sanctions and more concrete actions by the international community
Jordan's King Abdullah has also been quite reticent in discussing the Arab Spring
uprisings. Unrest and internal war in Syria could have a detrimental spillover effect on Jordan's
domestic stability. The uncertainty surrounding the potential collapse of Assad's regime has
caused a great deal of anxiety within Jordan's govemment. 149 There has been a desire to prevent
domestic opposition from using the violence in Syria as a platform for its own political gain. 150
Jordan hopes to become a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC"), so its government
has been attentive to GCC policy regarding Syria. Similarly, Jordan strives to maintain a good
relationship with Washington and thus also looks to U.S. foreign policy to guide its own
rhetoric. 151 Despite this caution in addressing violence in Syria, public statements from Amman
shifted toward harder criticism of Assad. In October, Abdullah gave an interview in which he
said the Syrian regime remains strong enough that it would be difficult for Assad to be
overthrown by the protesters. He also stated that the leaders in the Middle East had become
"wary of dealing with the West" and would be less likely to coordinate with the West in the
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immediate future. 152 On November 14, Abdullah changed his tune and urged Assad to turn over
the leadership of Syria to reformists, becoming the first of the Arab leaders to actually call for his
resignation, a move that resulted in an attack on the Jordanian diplomatic mission in
Damascus. 1s3 In an interview, Abdullah stated that Assad had been unwilling to engage in
dialogue with other countries and added that if Assad truly had "the interests of his country [in
mind], he would step down." 1s4 These statements came after members of the GCC and Arab
League had also condemned Assad, called for Syria's suspension from the Arab League and
discussed economic sanctions, meaning Abdullah's sentiments would not incur regional
backlash.
The Iranian government has been supporting Assad by providing weapons, surveillance
equipment and training to the Syrian military _Iss There is some evidence that Iran sent some of
its own forces to help Assad, as well as provided the regime with technology to monitor email,
cell phones and social media. 1s6 Iran says that the uprising is a ploy by foreign governments to
take down Assad. 1s7 The Iranian government responded to Turkey's criticism of Assad by partly
blaming Turkey's Prime Minister for the unrest. Tehran also cut off funding to Hamas after it
refused to hold rallies in the Gaza Strip in support of Assad. 1s8 Meanwhile, Iraq's security
concerns as a nation bordering Iran and Syria has led to a view that Assad should remain in
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power for the sake of stability. 159 Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has specifically pointed to
concerns about sectarian violence spreading to the entire region as a result of Syria's internal
clashes. 160
In Libya's case, Gaddafi lacked real allies and the continuation of his regime actually
threatened regional stability. Therefore, taking action in Libya that would hasten regime change,
in addition to protecting citizens, clearly benefitted the Western powers' national interests in the
stability of North Africa. Assad remaining in power has mainly been viewed as providing the
best chance at maintaining stability, as long as he yields to some of the protesters' demands. 161
The demographic dynamic of Syria is very different from that of Libya. Assad's Alawite sect of
Shia Islam that rules Syria makes up only twelve percent of the population. 162 Other minorities
include Druze, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, and Kurds. 163 As civil war appears imminent,
there is a concern about its implication for the ethnic and religious divides within Syria. Lately,
however, opinion seems to be shifting in that Assad has been increasingly viewed as detrimental
to regional stability. Unlike in Bahrain and Yemen, where the U.S. needs governments to remain

in power to retain regional stability and thereby ensure the security of U.S. political and
economic interests near the Gulf, the U.S. does not need Assad for any particular strategic
purpose. 164 In fact, a new regime may be beneficial to U.S. interests in the region, particularly
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with regard to offsetting the power of Iran. Yet others argue that a change from Shiite to Sunni
leadership actually would not affect Syria's positive partnership with Iran.
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B. Role of History on Policymakers' Decisions
The "legacy of the past" theory posits that events of the past contribute to shared national
memories and beliefs that shape countries' foreign policy. 166 National history's influence on state
leaders' policy has played a major role in the disparity between the international community's
responses to Libya and Syria. The memories of the United States and other countries that feel
responsible for previous genocides lead to determination to prevent those atrocities that can be
prevented. Meanwhile, Russia, China and other states that have a history of subjugation by
Western powers feel threatened by the broad interpretation of Resolution 1973 and will reject
interference in Bashar al-Assad's crackdown for the purpose of preserving the principle of state
sovereignty.
The collective experience ofObama's advisers has contributed to his foreign policy,
which emphasizes collective security and protection of civilians when feasible and appropriate.
In 2005, Obama sought out genocide scholar Samantha Power after reading her book, "A
Problem from Hell," which chronicles the many bungled responses by the U.S. to genocides
throughout the 20th century. 167 Power argues that governments like the Clinton administration
have consciously averted their attention from atrocities despite a moral responsibility to
intervene.
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Now, as Obama's anti-genocide adviser on the National Security Council, Power

has pushed for a number of atrocity prevention measures. The White House created a full-time
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position for monitoring atrocities in 2010. 169 The August 2011 Presidential Study Directive on
Mass Atrocities ("PSD") designated the prevention of mass atrocities as a main national security
interest and moral responsibility of the U.S. and created a standing Atrocities Prevention Board
to develop strategies. 170 In accordance with the R2P doctrine, the PSD provided for the
development of various options other than military action in response to or in prevention of mass
atrocities, with military action as a last resort. 171 The concern with preventing genocide has
prompted Obama to echo the sentiments of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Kofi
Annan and other world leaders by stating that just because states do not always have the
capacity to act, does not mean they should never act. 172
Some members of Obama's national security team worked for the Clinton administration
during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The current U.S. ambassador to the United Nations staff
and former staff member of Clinton's National Security Council, Susan Rice, has expressed
regret for inaction in Rwanda and has subsequently promoted the R2P doctrine. In a 2009 speech
to the U.N. Security Council, Rice reminded Member States that they had agreed in 2005 to
protect civilian populations from violations of international humanitarian law, and asserted that
the Obama administration "rejects the false choice between... security and ... values.'tl 73
Throughout the period of unrest in Syria, Rice repeatedly accused Assad of losing legitimacy by
using force on his people and denounced the October 4 Security Council veto, stating that "Libya
has been overused and misused as an excuse for countries to not take up their responsibilities
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with respect to Syria." 174 Hillary Rodham Clinton, now Secretary of State, also shares regret over
Rwanda because she advocated for intervention in Rwanda but failed to convince former
President Clinton. 175 Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, Power and other advisers familiar
with the humanitarian failures of the 1990s urged Obama to intervene in Libya. In response to
Syria, the U.S. has joined Canada and the European Union, which also have a shameful legacy of
failure to prevent atrocities, in issuing mounting targeted sanctions, such as asset freezes and
trade sanctions.
Another set of collective memories, the negative consequences of hasty and largely
unilateral wars, has also shaped Obama's worldview. The historical legacy of the Vietnam War
has often led U.S. leaders to incorrectly apply its lessons to current political situations. As the
infamous Vietnam War came to an end, fatigue with military operations in the region led U.S.
officials to ignore signs of genocide in neighboring Cambodia when dictator Pol Pot took over in
197 5. 176 In 1993, media coverage of the Battle of Mogadishu prompted public outcry at the
deaths of 18 American soldiers and resulted in U.S. withdrawal largely due to fear of another
quagmire in a politically complex situation involving elements of guerrilla warfare. 177 Former
President George W. Bush originally rejected the quagmire comparison of Iraq to Vietnam, but
in 2007 he used his own interpretation of that analogy as an argument against withdrawal from
Iraq. 178 The length, casualties and domestic unpopularity of the Iraq War, as well as the
difficulties of withdrawal, will caution U.S. leaders even further in foreign affairs. Thus, the
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mythical and selectively-used memory of Vietnam has taught U.S. politicians to be wary of
involvement in uncertain internal conflicts. One exception that Obama seems to have derived
from the lessons of previous U.S. wars is that U.N. approval and collective action, such as in the
first Gulf War and the Libyan intervention, negate many of the risks of such military
involvements. Therefore, U.S. historical legacy precludes the Obama administration from
becoming involved in Syria's ethnically and politically complex unrest without consensus in the
U.N. and collective burden-sharing among nations.
As can be seen in the development of hwnanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to
Protect doctrine, many countries have been very skeptical of establishing international law that
threatens their sovereignty and leaves them vulnerable to regime change through the guise of
hwnanitarian intervention. Their apprehension is a reaction to sovereignty issues implicated in
R2P generally and in NATO's interpretation of Resolution 1973 and the resulting regime change
specifically. China's concern over sovereignty issues comes as a response to its own historical
legacy concerning its myth of national hwniliation., which serves as the center of China's
political culture! 79 The century of national hwniliation took place from 1839 to 1949, a period
when Japan and several imperialist Western countries repeatedly subjected China to atrocities,
destruction and degradation. 180 Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has committed itself to
preventing any recurrence of such hwniliation by staunchly opposing any form of imperialism. 181
Therefore, China remains sensitive to breaches of territorial sovereignty by Western states in
pursuit of forcing their values onto other countries, and accordingly views the R2P doctrine
suspiciously.
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Similarly, the legacy of centuries of invasions by its European and Asian neighbors as
well as the decades of ideological and political friction with Western countries during the Cold
War contributes to Russia's stern disapproval and suspicion of forced intervention in sovereign
affairs. Another factor may be concerns about Russia's own political stability. The public
statements by Russian officials regarding the Libyan intervention and the Responsibility to
Protect reflect a level of paranoia about intervention as a legal norm. Above and beyond
questioning the legality ofGaddafi's death or the expansive interpretation of Resolution 1973,
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have gone to great lengths to
pronounce that NATO's intervention was contrary to international law.

182

In fact, Putin likened

the Libyan intervention to a medieval crusade. 183 Russian officials have denounced the use of
sanctions without authorization of the U.N. Security Council. 184 In October, Lavrov rejected the
notion that NATO's intervention saved lives. 185 His statements regarding the Responsibility to
Protect also reflected misunderstandings about the doctrine itself. He asserted that Western
governments seek to use force under R2P "in all cases when peoples begin to show displeasure
and ... the authorities use force to restore order." 186 Lavrov additionally implied that even a
resolution with only conditional sanctions signaled a desire by Western governments to act in
Syria as they had in Libya, and that the "Libyan model was a flagrant violation of the Security
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Council decisions and therefore ... internationallaw." 187He also suggested that limitations on
freedom are necessary to prevent anarchy. 188 Incidentally, an election in December led to
political protests, which Putin accused Secretary Clinton of provoking. As Putin has officially
registered his candidacy for his third term as president, his strong denouncement of intervention
in internal affairs has likely been linked to his personal concerns for internal stability during the
upcoming elections.
Likewise, national memories of former colonies have traditionally generated resistance to
the idea of humanitarian intervention. In the aftermath of Kosovo, developing nations that had
been subject to colonialism in the early 20th century especially opposed Kofi Annan's assertions
that some situations allowed for breach of territorial sovereignty in the name of
humanitarianism. 189 Former colonies felt threatened by the indication that NATO, a group of past
colonial powers, could legitimately decide to intervene in internal state affairs under a pretext of
humanitarian necessity. In October 2011, South Africa, India and Brazil opposed sanctions on
Syria in the aftermath ofNATO's broad interpretation ofResolution 1973's mandate. 190 These
countries usually put forth strong rhetoric in favor of human rights, yet their reactions to the
Arab Spring have been inconsistent with such rhetoric, most likely as a result of NATO's broad
interpretation of the U.N.'s mandate to protect civilians in Libya. 191 India and Brazil cautiously
approved of action against Libya but abstained on Resolution 1973, and South Africa actually
voted in favor. 192 As a result, South Africa received a regional and domestic backlash after
supporting the Libyan intervention and is now refraining from supporting any foreign
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interference in Syria.

193

In the perspective of many African countries, the NATO operation

seemed suspiciously reminiscent of colonial endeavors. Meanwhile, Brazil has appeared
skeptical about allowing major power interventions to go forward in the future, and India had
called for NATO airstrikes to cease prior to end of the NATO intervention. All three countries
have opposed sanctions on Syria, denounced the use of force and agreed that there should be no
repetition of a resolution like 1973 in Syria's case. 194 Therefore, even countries that allowed the
Libyan Intervention to proceed are now hesitant to head down a similar path due to national
memories of colonialism.

V. The Implications of the Arab Spring on the Future of the Responsibility to Protect
Doctrine
In determining whether an emerging norm is a part of customary international law, there
must be general practice of the doctrine, and that practice must be a result of the norm's
acceptance as law ("opinio juris"). 195 Minor deviations from a legal norm may occur without
affecting the requirement for general practice, whereas major deviations from general practice
will preclude a norm from becoming customary internationallaw. 196 The key aspects of practice
are generality and consistency .
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If there is a high level of consistency from a substantial

majority of states, then the fact that the practice has developed relatively recently is of less
importance. 198 The "opinio juris" aspect of customary international law requires that the acts
amount to a settled practice and are carried out in such a way that evidences a subjective belief
that the practice is regulated obligatory by the existence of a rule of law. 199 Thus the issue is
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whether there has been sufficient state practice and acceptance of Responsibility to Protect as a
legal norm for the doctrine to be part of international customary law.
The history over the last few decades of the developing practice of humanitarian
intervention and later the R2P doctrine demonstrates that there has been general practice of the
norm by many states, including African and Arab countries, as well as international and regional
organizations, most notably the United Nations. The legal foundations ofR2P, as noted by the
2001 ICISS report, assert that it has a strong basis in international law. Furthermore, the amount
of reports and resolutions endorsing the doctrine as an emerging norm and the number of
statements by world leaders referring to R2P as an international obligation shows that the "opinio
juris" requirement of customary international law has been met. Even after the Libyan
intervention produced suspicion among many former colonies, most countries have continued to
at least support the aspect of the R2P doctrine that urges non-military actions to protect civilians.
Therefore, the most controversial part of R2P is authorization for use of force under the
doctrine. This results from the reality that strategic interests often accompany humanitarian
intervention. In order for all aspects of this norm to become customary international law and
truly prevent future atrocities, strategic interests must remain as removed as possible from the
invocation of R2P so the doctrine can gain legitimacy through consistent application. For if fear
and distrust of underlying motives leads to a rejection of the doctrine's option for use of force as
a last resort, then the entire doctrine will be toothless and has no chance of deterring ruthless
leaders like Gaddafi or Assad. Russia and China defended their vetoes of the Security Council
resolution on sanctioning Syria by invoking the importance of state sovereignty and expressing
concern that the Libyan intervention has encouraged a new trend of violating such
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sovereignty?00 In particular, Russia has specifically stated that it rejects the Responsibility to
Protect norm because of its concern for violations of state sovereignty and its inconsistent
application based on ulterior motives of intervening countries. Rejection of a rule of international
custom by one or a few countries does not negate its application as international law to other
countries. However, if Russia remains a persistent and public objector to the R2P doctrine and
continues to act in accordance with its rejection of the principle, then it may not be bound by the
rule even if it is otherwise recognized as customary international law.
Russia's rejection of the R2P doctrine is particularly discouraging because of its position
on the U.N. Security Council. At every stage of the R2P's development, the consensus has
acknowledged that triggering the doctrine requires Security Council authorization. Since Russia
has veto power, it can singlehandedly prevent the further practice of the norm. This has been
demonstrated in its response to Syria's unrest, in that Russia has refused to allow even
conditional sanctions, on the inaccurate basis that doing so would open the door to another
Libyan-style intervention. If the international community wants to continue to apply the R2P
doctrine to situations where governments fail to protect their citizens from atrocities, it must
come together to strongly criticize Russia for thwarting effective actions in a situation where
crimes against humanity have been consistently perpetuated against civilians. Alternatively, the
U.N. Member States must find a substitute method for implementing R2P, perhaps by allowing
regional bodies like the Arab League greater leeway in executing the doctrine without express
Security Council authorization. Otherwise, the political determinations of five countries will
continue to constrain the development of the R2P doctrine, due to the doctrine's reliance on the
Security Council and the Council's outdated structure and voting rules.
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Ultimately, the Libyan Intervention will be a tool for judging the legitimacy of the
doctrine. It has been accused of exceeding the scope of authority granted by the Security
Council, by creating regime change instead of merely protecting civilian life. It has been
criticized for causing some civilian casualties. Some leaders have questioned the legality under
international law of NATO's role in Gaddafi's death. Gaddafi's family announced on October 26
that they planned to file a war crimes complaint, with the International Criminal Court against
NATO commanders and leaders of its Member States, concerning his demise and previous
attacks on Gaddafi's family members? 01 In February 2011, Resolution 1970 referred the Libyan
situation to the ICC, which therefore has the authority to prosecute any person responsible for
commission of war crimes since then. 202 On October 27, the U.N. Security Council voted
unanimously to end NATO's military operation in Libya. 203 The operation's status as a success
will be cemented if Libya's National Transition Council manages a peaceful transition to a
democratic society, though this process will undoubtedly be riddled with difficulties. It can then
be used as a model for future responses to such threats of mass atrocities, though the specifics
should differ based on the details of the situation and the necessity of force as a last resort. In the
meantime, a careful balancing of world powers' national interests, humanitarian concerns within
Syria, and the outlook for regional stability will determine what type of action, if any, will take
place in Syria.
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